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RESPONSIVE JUSTICE IN CHINA DURING 
TRANSITIONAL TIMES: REVISITING THE 
JUGGLING PATH BETWEEN ADJUDICATORY 
AND MEDIATORY JUSTICE 
GU WEIXIA

 
China has been discussed in international literature as a transitional 
state in both social and economic senses; however, scholarly literature 
analyzing how China’s justice system responds to the country’s social and 
economic transitions is scant. This Article studies the international 
“transitional justice” framework that examines justice systems in 
economic, societal, and political transition in post-Communism Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) jurisdictions. Although China is not a 
transitional state in a political sense, the transitional justice framework, 
particularly its analyses on how successor regimes in CEE countries deal 
with the aftermath of economic restructuring and societal reparations 
through the justice system, is of relevance to China’s ongoing judicial 
reforms and its future development. By comparing the judicial situation in 
China to that of CEE countries during transitional times, this Article 
attempts to analyze China’s distinctive judicial response to her massive 
economic and societal transformation so as to conceptualize “responsive 
justice” in China during transitional times. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China has been discussed in international literature as a transitional 
state in social and economic senses;
1
 however, literature analyzing how 
China’s justice system responds to the country’s social and economic 
transitions is scant. This Article studies Professor Teitel’s “transitional 
justice” framework, which examines how the justice systems in post-
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 1. See KEN MORITA & YUN CHEN, TRANSITION, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
GLOBALIZATION: CHINA AND CENTRAL EUROPE (2010). 
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Communism Central and Eastern European (CEE) jurisdictions respond to 
massive economic, societal, and political transitions.
2
 China is not a 
transitional state in the political sense wherein the state is transitioning 
from authoritarian rule to building a democracy; however, international 
studies on “transitional justice,” particularly on how successor regimes in 
CEE countries deal with the aftermath of economic restructuring and 
societal reparations during transitional times through the response of the 
judiciary, are pertinent to current Chinese society and governance, and will 
shed light on China’s ongoing judicial reforms as well as its future 
development.  
This Article gives a comprehensive analysis of the above issues and is 
intended to make three contributions. First, by comparing current judicial 
situations in China to the international “transitional justice” framework, 
this Article attempts to analyze the distinctive response of China’s 
judiciary towards the country’s massive economic and societal transitions 
so as to conceptualize “responsive justice” in China during transitional 
times. In doing so, this Article compares China and CEE jurisdictions as 
transitional states in social and economic senses, and examines the 
judiciary’s responses to the transitions within both jurisdictions. Through 
comparative research, this Article concludes that China’s justice system 
displays salient features that distinguish it from other transitional states in 
responding to massive social and economic transformation. Second, as 
China does not fall squarely into the category of a transitional state, 
particularly in regard to its political system, this Article proposes the new 
idea of “responsive justice” and attempts to conceptualize it for China. 
This will also contribute to the international transitional justice literature 
and be relevant to judiciary and justice development discourses in 
jurisdictions not undergoing political transformation. Third, with respect 
to China’s future judicial path, this Article identifies the tensions, worries, 
compromises, and expectations of different currents in China’s ongoing 
judicial reform as the country faces deepening marketization and 
intensifying social movements. Facing many challenges, the author argues 
that the Chinese government should reconsider the path of China’s judicial 
reform and the importance and relevance of both Western experience 
(universal-value-based rule-of-law, judicial independence, etc.) and her 
home-grown alternatives (mediatory justice, but in proper forms) so as to 
turn “responsive justice” into serious judicial justice. 
 
 
 2. See RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000). 
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This Article is organized into four parts. Following the Introduction, 
Part II discusses China’s three rounds of judicial reforms from 1999 to 
2013. It examines the checkered development of judicial reforms in China 
between adjudicatory and mediatory justice over the past one and a half 
decades. Comparing China’s recent judicial responses to economic and 
societal changes with the international framework on transitional justice 
featuring CEE jurisdictions, Part III attempts to identify the distinctive 
features present in the current Chinese justice context in responding to 
economic and social transitions and to conceptualize “responsive justice” 
in China. Part III also argues that, to serve China’s deepening 
marketization and intensifying social movements, mediation can still play 
an important role and has socioeconomic impact in the Chinese justice 
system; however, judicial mediation should be adopted legally and 
properly rather than for purely political motives. Part IV concludes the 
Article and looks at the future direction of judicial reform in China for 
rendering real judicial justice. 
II. CHECKERED DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL REFORM OVER ONE AND A 
HALF DECADES (1999–2013): PENDULUM SWINGS BETWEEN MEDIATORY 
AND ADJUDICATORY JUSTICE 
A. From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice 
In the past one and a half decades, the Supreme People’s Court 
(“SPC”) initiated three rounds of reforms and measures to improve 
China’s judicial infrastructure. The first of these reforms was the Five-
Year Reform Plan of the People’s Court (First-Five-Year-Reform-Plan) 
from 1999–2003, 3  which focused on promoting the quality of judges 
through a more depoliticized judicial selection system.
4
 Subsequently, in 
October 2004, the SPC promulgated the Outline of the Second-Five-Year 
Reform Plan of the People’s Court (Second-Five-Year-Reform-Outline) 
from 2004–2008.5 
 
 
 3. Renmin Fayuan Wunian Gaige Gangyao 1999–2003 (人民法院五年改革纲要) [Five-Year 
Reform Plan of the People’s Court], (Oct. 20, 1999), http://china.findlaw.cn/info/guojiafa/xffl/ 
124828.html. 
 4. Id. art. 32. In the next five years, all the people’s courts must gradually adopt a selection 
system which requires that the higher court judges be selected from the most-qualified judges of lower 
courts, and judges be selected from high-performance lawyers or other high-level legal professionals. 
Law school graduates and others who are newly recruited from the public recruitment examination 
should first work for the intermediate people’s courts and basic people’s courts. Id.  
 5. Renmin Fayuan Di’erge Wunian Gaige Gangyao 2004–2008 (人民法院第二个五年改革纲
要 ) [Outline of the Second-Five-Year Reform Plan by the People’s Court], (Oct. 26, 2005), 
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The First-Five-Year-Reform-Plan took place against the backdrop of 
steady growth in the number of court cases, especially in large coastal 
cities. Pressure gradually increased on judges during the years prior to the 
First-Five-Year-Reform-Plan to decide cases quickly, relying on formal 
rules with little time to consider the social consequences of their 
judgments.
6
 With the core of these judicial changes being the promotion of 
judicial justice and efficiency, the emphasis on substantive justice shifted 
to procedural justice, which in turn indicated a shift from judge-centric 
justice to party-centric justice.
7
 These changes, focusing on judicial 
professionalism, procedural justice reform, and the introduction of 
adversarial proceedings, led to the steady decline of mediated cases from 
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.
8
 Chinese authorities, under the First-
Five-Year-Reform-Plan, attempted to reverse some of these changes 
beginning in 2002 by restoring people’s mediation committees 
administered by local villagers and residents committees, which had 
previously been spurned during the legal changes of the 1980s and 1990s.
9
 
The Second-Five-Year-Reform-Outline set bolder reform goals, as it 
laid out no fewer than fifty objectives for upgrading the Chinese court 
system. As a whole, the provisions demonstrated a cautious awareness of 
the importance of greater professionalism, independence, and integrity of 
the judiciary. At the same time, the provisions aimed to reduce local 
protectionism and stamp out corruption while acknowledging the 
leadership by the Party and supervision by people’s congresses at each 
level.
10
 On collective independence, the SPC sought, through the Second-
Five-Year-Reform-Outline, to enhance the autonomy of local people’s 
courts and began to explore the establishment of guaranteed financing for 
local courts by inserting provisions in central and provincial government 
budgets.
11
 Perhaps the program’s boldest proposal was loosening the grip 
of local power holders over local courts. The SPC called for, “within a 
certain geographic area, the implementation of a system of uniform 
 
 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=120832 [hereinafter Second-Five-Year Reform Plan]. 
 6. Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil 
Justice Reform in China, CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
39 (Woo & Gallagher eds., 2011). 
 7. Id. at 39–40. 
 8. Id. at 42.  
 9. Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM J. COMP. L. 935, 945 (2011). See also 
Aaron Halegua, Reforming the People’s Mediation System in Urban China (2005) 35 HKLJ 715, 747–
50. 
 10. For the reassertion of the leadership under the Party and people’s congress, see Second-Five-
Year Reform Plan, supra note 5, art 7. 
 11. Id. art. 48.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/6
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recruitment and uniform assignment of local judges in basic and 
intermediate courts by the upper level people’s courts.”12 
Judicial personnel were required to pass the national judicial exam to 
get qualified (which was reflected in the amended Judges’ Law in 2001).13 
Existing judges now needed to participate in annual judicial training to 
keep up-to-date on professional knowledge.
14
 Some other legal education 
programs in the area of commercial law, particularly international 
commercial transactions, also began in China in an attempt to respond to 
the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). For 
example, beginning in 1999, provincial and intermediate-court-level 
judges began attending the Tsinghua-Temple International Business Law 
program sponsored by the SPC, with more than 500 judges having since 
graduated from the program.
15
 Local judges from coastal area courts have 
had more chances to study abroad due to the more developed economies 
and more liberal administrations of those areas.
16
 This supports the 
findings of better enforcement records of both judgments and arbitral 
awards in coastal city courts.
17
 These measures are seen as important steps 
to improve the institutionalization and professionalization of Chinese 
courts. 
Despite the bold objectives to cultivate the Chinese judiciary’s 
professionalism, beginning in 2003, judicial reform projects underwent 
criticism for importing formal law and legal institutions that might have 
satisfied urban users but that completely failed to harmonize with practical 
realities in China’s rural areas.18 There were also criticisms that, under the 
corrosive influence of Western legal concepts, Chinese courts and officials 
had been led astray from their populist roots.
19
 Alongside the castigation 
 
 
 12. Id. art. 37.  
  13.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Faguan Fa (中华人民共和国法官法) Chapter V, Article 12 
[Judges’ Law of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), translation available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383686.htm.  
 14. Second-Five-Year Reform Plan, supra note 5, art. 39. 
 15. Interview with Huang Ying, Judge, Shanghai Higher People’s Court (Jan. 12, 2010). 
 16. For example, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court provides a western legal training 
program to its judges. Each year since 1998, around fifteen judges have been sent to the University of 
Hong Kong Law Faculty to study in the Master of Common Law (MCL) program.. The University of 
Hong Kong has a collaborative agreement for training for the Shenzhen judiciary. See Gu Weixia, The 
Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo Vadis Chinese Courts?, 2 Chinese J. Comp. 
L. 1, 28 n.161 (2013). 
 17. Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN 
L. 97, 122–32 (2005).  
 18. Minzner, supra note 9, at 947. 
 19. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of judicial reform measures, judicial mediation gradually regained 
popularity. 
Politically, to implement the “harmonious society” state policy 
promoted since 2006,
 
Chinese authorities have placed an increasing 
emphasis on mediation.
20
 Mediation is encouraged and even prioritized for 
being conducive to social stability and harmony.
21
 More subtly, the 
economic boom over the past three decades has led to massive socio-
economic issues, and the courts and formal adjudication cannot resolve all 
such tensions and conflicts within Chinese society.
22
 The current Party line 
reiterates the Party’s control and an increase in the flexibility with which 
courts can decide cases emphasizing “the feeling of the masses” and social 
conditions as well as the Constitution and laws.
23
 Corresponding to the 
more subtle societal change and public manifestation of discontent, judges, 
at the same time, have been provided with training to deal with social 
unrest cases through mediation.
24
 In 2007, the SPC published Several 
Opinions on the Further Development of the Positive Function of 
Mediation during Litigation in the Construction of a Socialist Harmonious 
Society. Accordingly, in SPC’s 2008 annual work report, 59% of civil 
 
 
 20.  See generally Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexieshehui Ruogan 
Zhongda Wenti De Jueding (中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定) [Decision of the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Concerning Several Important Questions for Building a 
Harmonious Socialist Society], (11 October 2006), http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/64168/ 
64569/72347/6347991.html is translation available?; Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership 
Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society’, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101101610.html See also 
Building Harmonious Society CPC’s Top Task, CHINA DAILY (20 Feb 2005), http://www.China 
Daily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/20/content_417718.htm. 
 21. Stanley Lubman, Chinese Law after Sixty Years, EAST ASIA FORUM (Oct. 2, 2009), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/02/chinese-law-after-sixty-years/. 
 22. Qin Xudong, Calling for Judicial Reform, ZHONGGUO GAIGE (中国改革) [CHINA REFORM 
MAGAZINE], Jan. 15, 2010. 
 23. Jerome Cohen, Body Blow for the Judiciary, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 2008, at 
A13, available at http://www.scmp.com/article/656696/body-blow-judiciary. 
 24. These social unrest cases include, for example, mass torts claims such as the reported tainted 
milk case, nail house demolishing case, derivative action, etc., which involves a large number of 
litigants. During the tainted milk incident, authorities warned lawyers to refuse lawsuits for fear of 
rising social unrest. See Ng Tze-wei, Lawyers warned to shun milk suits, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Sept. 23, 2008, available at http://www.scmp.com/article/653669/lawyers-warned-shun-milk-suits. In 
addition, land seizures by the government in the past decade are one of the causes of worsening social 
unrest. See Joseph Kahn, Pace and Scope of Protest in China Accelerated in ‘05’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/international/asia/20china.html?_r=0. Contrary 
to curbing the disputes, socioeconomic cases such as welfare claims and labour disputes have attracted 
widespread attention of people ranging from party officials to the media and the public as politically 
sensitive cases have. See Fu Yulin & Randall Peerenboom, A New Analytical Framework for 
Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: 
LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 112 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/6
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cases were settled by judicial mediation, as compared to the 26.7% 
resolved between 2004 and 2008.
25
 
B. Rise and Prioritization of Mediation 
Most recently in March 2009, in response to the rise of social conflicts 
that came as a “by-product” of rapid economic growth, the SPC published 
its Third-Five-Year Reform Plan of the People’s Court (Third-Five-Year-
Reform-Plan) (2009-2013).
26
 With a sudden surge in the number of 
petitions to the central authorities in Beijing in the early 2000s due to 
litigants’ dissatisfaction with court decisions, the earlier judicial reforms 
became a scapegoat.
27
 More importantly, it was determined that the courts 
had failed to make positive contributions to maintaining social stability by 
containing disputes. The Chinese Communist Party (“CCP” or “the 
Party”) had designated the courts as a “major contributor” 28  towards 
maintaining broad social order. As the number of civil court cases began 
steadily rising, the CCP believed that the courts had failed to prevent and 
end disputes in accordance with the CCP’s primary strategy of social 
control, and that the courts’ failure to fulfill this essential political duty 
had been brought about by their professionalization.
29
 The consequent 
reversal from adjudicatory to mediatory justice in China is comparable to 
the development of “responsive law” as per the arguments of Philippe 
Nonet and Philip Selznick in Law and Society in Transition, where the 
authors argued: 
Contemporary law was in the process of evolving to a higher legal 
stage of “responsive law” involving a “renewal of instrumentalism . . . for 
 
 
 25. Vicki Waye & Ping Xiong, The Relationship between Mediation and Judicial Proceedings in 
China, 6 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 6 (2011). 
 26. Renmin Fayuan Di’sange Wunian Gaige Gangyao 2009–2013 (人民法院第三个五年改革
纲要) [The Third-Five-Year Reform Plan of the People’s Court], PEKING UNIVERSITY (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?db=chl&gid=114912&encodingname=big5http://www.pkul
aw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=114912&EncodingName=big5%3E%20accessed%209%20A
ugust%202013%20 [hereinafter Third-Five-Year-Reform Plan]. 
 27. Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 45. The problems were aggravated by bureaucratic case 
handling, excessive court fees, corruption, and even enhanced expectations when people did not get 
substantive justice. Donald Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development 396–97 
(GWU Law Sch., Public Law Research Paper no. 187, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=878672. See also Randall Peerenboom & He Xin, Dispute Resolution in 
China: Patterns, Causes and Prognosis 10–19 (La Trobe Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Working 
Paper Series Paper Number 2008/9, 2008), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/ealr/ 
articles/Volume4/issue1/PeerenboomHe4E.AsiaL.Rev.1(2009).pdf. 
 28. Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 46. 
 29. Id. at 45. 
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more objective public ends”, which signifies a breakthrough from the 
previous formalistic stage of “autonomous law” in which law and politics 
were separated and decisions were made strictly in conformity with legal 
rules without contemplating the consequences.
30
 
Compared to the first two reform plans, the Third-Five-Year-Reform-
Plan placed more emphasis on the “mass line.” The “mass line” refers to 
“adjudication for the people”31—it encourages the use of mediation and 
relies on Party leadership and socio-economic conditions in decision-
making processes with the law as a secondary consideration.
32
 This 
approach mandates that judicial reform must be politically correct and be 
“within the boundaries of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”33 Some 
authors have opined that this court reform agenda will help facilitate social 
harmony and genuinely reflect transitional justice while many others argue 
that the plan is a “cautious document not touching on systematic issues 
under the Party leadership.” 34  The latter argument is propounded by 
Minzner, who attacks China’s turn against law through the illustration of a 
practice known as the “target responsibility” system,35 which manipulates 
judges’ behavior. Minzner calls mediation an “artificial panacea for social 
stability.”36 
Widely employed by the Chinese administrative governance and 
bureaucracy, the “target responsibility” system referred to by Minzner is 
used to evaluate, reprimand, and reward Party and government officials, 
including judges, by linking officials’ careers and salaries with their 
success in attaining performance goals—which are usually numerical—
including higher use of mediation and expeditious case closure.
37
 Those 
who meet the targets receive salary and career rewards, whereas those who 
fail face sanctions.
38
 As Chinese courts have placed greater emphasis on 
 
 
 30. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Tension between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law, 33 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 131, 149 (2005), quoting PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW 
AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 15 (1978). 
 31. For a discussion of “坚持群众路线” (Adherence to the “mass line”) see Third-Five-Year-
Reform-Plan, supra note 26, at pt 1(3). 
 32. Third-Five-Year-Reform Plan, supra note 26, art 1(3). 
 33. Jiangyu Wang, China: Legal Reform in an Emerging Socialist Market Economy, in LAW AND 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND INNOVATIONS 56 (Ann Black & Gary 
F. Bell eds., 2011). 
 34. See Qin Yudong, Judicial Reform: A New Round, CAIJING MAG., Jan. 24, 2009, available at 
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-01-24/110051303.html. 
 35. For a discussion of “target responsibility” see Third-Five-Year-Reform-Plan, supra note 26, 
at pt 1(3). 
 36. Minzner, supra note 9, at 963. 
 37. Id. at 956. 
 38. Id. See generally Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/6
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the importance of mediation since 2003, they have elevated the required 
mediation target rates for civil litigation. In some cases, targets can reach 
unbelievably high figures, ranging from sixty percent to over ninety 
percent.
39
 For instance, the successful mediation rate at the Henan 
Provincial High People’s Court is as high as sixty to eighty percent of its 
first instance civil disputes.
40
 The implementation of this reward system, 
which guarantees that higher mediation rates correspond with higher 
incomes, has resulted in substantial increases in the number of cases 
resolved by mediation, and even mediation competition among many 
Chinese courts.
41
 
Meanwhile, the target responsibility system promoting mediation has 
led to problematic judicial behavior as it puts judges’ careers at stake and 
thus pressures judges into forcing parties to settle. For example, in order to 
achieve the goal of dissolving street protests organized by unpaid workers, 
courts have redirected their efforts away from adjudicating cases to 
appease workers, taking illogical measures to reach private, closed-door 
settlements. One example of these illogical, backroom settlements is 
paying workers’ wages using court budgets. 42  As this example 
demonstrates, heightened instrumentalism of law, where legal rules are 
tools to achieve desired objectives, requires judges to focus on attaining 
both legal justice and goal-oriented substantive policy justice. While 
modern judges engage in two types of analysis in accordance with law and 
policy goals respectively, Chinese judges have grown to be partial to the 
instrumentalist view and policy objective of the law, which—in 
Tamanaha’s commentary on the tension between instrumentalism and rule 
of law—requires judges to manipulate legal rules to reach the desired 
result when the legally right outcome differs from the policy-oriented 
outcome.
43
 
The “redress” described above does not contribute to social stability in 
the long run, as it fails to solve the underlying problems of public 
discontentment.
44
 Given that circumstances in various cases are unlikely to 
 
 
Management from a Township Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 35, 38–40 (2003). 
 39. Wang Hongwei, Yichangjiufen, tiaojie haishi panjue （一场纠纷，调解，还是判决) [A 
Dispute, Mediate or Adjudicate], LEGAL DAILY, Oct. 21, 2009 (detailing the requirement of the Henan 
Province High People’s Court that between sixty and eighty percent of first instance civil disputes be 
successfully mediated). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Minzner, supra note 9, at 958. 
 42. Yang Su & He Xin, Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor Protest in South 
China, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157, 157–70 (2010). 
 43. Tamanaha, supra note 30, at 150. 
 44. Minzner, supra note 9, at 961. 
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be identical, the same set of applicable rules must be reshaped to bring 
about specific results. Hence, legal instrumentalism in China, made 
manifest in the priority of mediation in judicial reform, can only lead to 
inconsistency and unpredictability in rule application, and it thus fails to 
establish essential binding legal rules.
45
 As Minzner concludes, the 
shortsighted concessions (in the “pretense” of social harmony) are likely 
to result in long-term ramifications and further aggravate social problems, 
as they send a message to disputants that they can achieve what they want 
by orchestrating protests without resorting to legal channels at all.
46
  
C. Analyses and Comments 
The reverse turn of judicial reform and the stress on the “mass line” 
can also be analyzed from the perspective of the personal backgrounds of 
the leaders of the Chinese judiciary.
47
 When China acceded to the WTO in 
2001, most of the presidents of the provincial-level high courts, if not all, 
had a formal, systematic legal education.
48
 The then-Chief Justice and 
President of the SPC, Xiao Yang, had both a university legal education 
and practical qualification in law.
49
 His successor, Wang Shengjun, who 
took over the office of the presidency of the SPC in late 2008, had neither 
a legal education background nor any judicial experience.
50
 Wang, who 
worked previously as a Party Central-Political-Legal-Committee official, 
was appointed merely because of his political and administrative 
background.
51
 In association with Wang’s appointment, the newly 
appointed presidents of the high courts in a few provinces took their 
offices without any formal legal training either.
52
 These appointments 
were highly controversial and led to serious criticism of the judiciary for 
departing from its previous professionalism-building movement.
53
  
 
 
 45. Tamanaha, supra note 30, at 150. 
 46. Minzner, supra note 9, at 962. 
  47. The “mass line” refers to the inclusion of “the feelings of the masses” as part of the criteria as 
Chinese courts deliberate cases. See Cohen, supra note 23. 
 48. Cohen, supra note 23. 
  49. Biography of Xiao Yang, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Mar. 16, 2003, available at http://english. 
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 52. Gu Weixia, The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo Vadis Chinese 
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The recent change in the tone of reform reflected by the Third-Five-
Year-Reform-Plan also needs to be analyzed and understood in the context 
of Party policy on the judiciary. On November 28, 2008, the Politburo of 
the Party Central Committee issued the Opinions on Deepening the 
Reform of the Judicial System and Its Working Mechanisms.
54
 This 
document did not respond to the increasing demands for major systematic 
reforms found in the previous two rounds of SPC reform plans, which 
were discussing changes to the way to fund the judiciary and appoint 
judges, providing greater powers of judicial review to courts, or 
eliminating interference with judicial independence.
55
 Instead, the 
document placed strong emphasis on “Chinese characteristics” and 
“national conditions” with “popularization of law.”56 For this purpose, the 
tasks of judicial reform as set out by the Party agenda are to optimize the 
distribution of judicial functions and powers, balance the strict execution 
of criminal law with clemency in certain situations, stress the function of 
judicial service, as well as achieve flexibility, social stability and 
predictability.
57
 In a sense, the development trend of the Chinese judiciary 
has followed closely and even solidified the so-called “Three Supremes” 
Party theory advanced by Party leader Hu Jintao at the end of 2007.
58
 
According to this theory, the mission of the Chinese courts and the work 
of Chinese judges should always regard as supreme the leadership of the 
Party and people’s interests, as well as the Constitution and law.59 
To summarize the three rounds of judicial reforms from 1999 to 2013, 
it seems that the SPC introduced quite a few directives aimed at the 
 
 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/01/the-prc-legal-system-at-sixty/. 
 54. See Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui guanyu shenhua sifa tizhi he gongzuo jizhi gaige ruogan 
went de yijian (中央政法委员会关于深化司法体制和工作机制改革若干问题的意见) (Sept. 19, 
2010), http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0919/21/3471365_54959240.shtml. This new trend of 
judicial reform and its failure to respond to systematic issues raised by the two previous rounds of SPC 
Five-Year reform plans sparked wide discussion by legal academics and practitioners on the same 
website in 2009.  
 55. See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text. 
 56. Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui guanyu shenhua sifa tizhi he gongzuo jizhi gaige ruogan 
went de yijian, supra note 54. 
 57. Id. 
 58. China: Events of 2009, HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87491 (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2014). See also Legal Daily (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/ 
index_article/content/2009-12/14/content_2004336.htm (last accessed June 17, 2015). 
 59. Wang Doudou, Wang Shengjun:”san ge zhishang” shi fayuan shizhong jianchi de zhidao 
sixiang (王胜俊：”三个至上”是法院始终坚持的指导思想 ) [Wang Shengjun: “The Three 
Supremes” is the Guiding Ideology the Courts Must Always Uphold], LEGAL DAILY (June 23, 2008), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-06/23/content_8420938.htm (examining the speech by President 
Wang Shengjun on the correlation between the new round of judicial reform and the “Three 
Supremes” theory advanced by Hu Jintao). 
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independence and integrity of the judiciary at an early stage. It also 
attempted to provide educational opportunities for lower-level judges. The 
improved independence and education was expected to bring about 
increased judicial credibility and accountability. Although an optimistic 
view was taken towards the implementation of the very ambitious Second-
Five-Year-Reform-Outline, so far neither the practice of “guaranteed 
financing”60 nor “uniform recruitment”61 of lower level judges has been 
reported.
62
 The most recent Third-Five-Year-Reform-Plan has failed to 
touch upon these implementation issues as well. As such, the real extent to 
which these reforms have actually been implemented is yet to be seen. 
Insiders know that these meticulous changes in the course of judicial 
reform reflect tensions and struggles inherent to political reform.
63
 They 
also tie in well with an earlier observation by Professor Jerome Cohen, 
who insightfully points out that the political status quo in China does not 
allow rapid expansion of judicial power, as the Party government may not 
wish to make quick changes, especially those that might threaten the 
primacy of administrative power.
64
 This, seen from another perspective, 
explains the checkered path of Chinese judicial reform in the course of 
economic and social transitions, which is largely subject to the country’s 
further political and administrative liberalization. Therefore, more 
breakthroughs need to take place to empower the courts and individual 
judges in decision-making processes. The success of reform can only be 
tested according to its actual degree of implementation in practice. 
III. CONCEPTUALIZING “RESPONSIVE JUSTICE” IN CHINA 
In assessing the development of the judiciary and justice system in 
China, particularly its discourse over the past fifteen years, the 
international literature on “transitional justice” developed by Professor 
Ruti Teitel, which is concerned with rule of law development in 
transitional political and economic regimes in post-Communism CEE 
countries, is helpful. Although China is not a transitional state in a 
political sense, the studies on how successor regimes in CEE countries 
deal with the aftermath of economic restructuring and societal reparations 
 
 
 60. Second-Five-Year-Reform Plan, supra note 5, art. 48. 
 61. Id. art. 37. 
 62. Weixia Gu, China’s Arbitration: Restricted Reform, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE 
LEGAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 280–81 (Guanghua Yu ed., 2011). 
 63.  Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 39, 55. See also Peerenboom & He, supra note 27, at 20. 
 64. Jerome A Cohen, China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, 2 FAR E. ECON. REV. 23, 26 
(2006).  
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during transitional times through judicial responses is relevant to China’s 
present and future society governance and judicial reform. Part III thus 
examines Teitel’s transitional justice framework and compares it with the 
Chinese judicial context. This Part attempts to look into the following four 
questions. First, what is Teitel’s transitional justice framework and what 
are the common issues that arise in transitional jurisdictions that require 
judicial response against the backdrop of a rapidly changing society? 
Second, with reference to Teitel’s framework, what are the common 
features between the transitions of CEE jurisdictions and the change in 
governance in China such that the transitional justice theory would be of 
relevance to China? Third, by comparing the judicial context of China 
with the judicial situation of countries studied under Teitel’s framework, 
what are the distinctive features of China’s justice in the face of a rapidly 
transforming economy and society? Fourth, should mediation be 
abandoned or does it still have a role to play in China’s justice system 
during transitional times, given the country’s deepening marketization and 
intensifying social movements? By exploring answers to the above 
questions, this Part aims to develop a “responsive justice” theory adapted 
to Chinese judicial development in economic and societal transitional 
times. 
A. Teitel’s Transitional Justice Framework 
The term “transitional justice” was coined by Ruti Teitel in 1991 at the 
time of the Soviet collapse and shortly after Latin American transitions to 
democracy in the late 1980s.
65
 It aimed at accounting for the “self-
conscious construction of a distinctive conception of justice associated 
with periods of radical political change following past oppressive rule.”66 
Teitel suggests that, in the context of East European transitions following 
the collapse of Communism, the pre-eminent characteristic of transitional 
justice is that “the structure of the legal response was inevitably shaped by 
the circumstances and the parameters of the associated political 
conditions.”67 Therefore, transitional justice might not reflect the ideal, 
according to traditional notions of justice. In such hyper-politicized 
moments, the law operates differently and is often incapable of meeting all 
the traditional values associated with the rule of law. 
 
 
 65. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Globalized, 0 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1 (2008). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 1–2. 
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Focusing on transitions from authoritarian rule to the building of 
democracies, Teitel comments extensively on how successor regimes deal 
with the aftermath of massive economic restoration and human rights 
abuses, as well as how they make reparations to compensate victims and 
hold perpetrators accountable for their acts.
68
 In times of transition, justice 
and accountability take on new roles that are at odds with the conventional 
interpretations of the terms. These new roles are a combination of a 
backward-looking approach to implicate the past regime and the forward-
thinking transitional features that seek to restore, rehabilitate, and 
liberalize political change.
69
 In the transitional period, the law is caught 
between the past and future, between retrospective and prospective, 
between the individual and the collective.
70
 Transitional justice is, 
therefore, a unique combination of a past regime and the future.  
In a context of political and economic flux, legal adjudication may 
have to struggle between settled and unsettled rules and ideologies; as a 
result, the judiciary’s activities can only be understood as responsive 
towards transitional economies and politics.
71
 According to Teitel, the 
common issues that arise in transitional justice are as follows: First, it is 
difficult to reconcile various rule-of-law values in times of transition;
72
 
second, compared to institutions in ordinary times, legislatures in 
transition and volatile times often lack the competence required, thus 
prompting judicial decision making to take place;
73
 and third, it is common 
for constitutional courts to assume a significant role in the transitional 
period.
74
 
In established legal systems, rule-of-law values of prospectivity, 
continuity, general applicability, and equal protection are fully compatible, 
working together to form a cohesive legal system. In transitional periods 
of political flux, rule-of-law is a concept that embodies different 
irreconcilable values, and such values are given different weights in 
varying contexts of transitional justice. For example, both Hungary and 
Germany had to determine whether lifting the stautute of limitations was 
constitutional and in accordance with the rule of law for serious crimes 
 
 
 68. TEITEL, supra note 2, at 1–6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 220. 
  72. Id. at 16–17. 
  73. Id. at 24. 
 74. See infra note 75. 
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with both counties having different interpretations of this legal inquiry.
75
 
When confronted with conflicting rule-of-law values in transitional 
periods and formulating a transformative understanding of the rule-of-law, 
the decision concerning which will dominate needs to depend on 
distinctive historical and political legacies of respective jurisdictions.
76
 
Regarding the judicial role in transitional times, Teitel notes that in 
established democracies, activist judicial decision making is considered 
illegitimate, as it challenges settled law, and because, unlike the elected 
legislature, judges lack democratic legitimacy and accountability.
77
 
However, Teitel argues that this view may not be applicable to countries in 
periods of political and societal flux with a transitional legislature that is 
often not freely elected and, in any event, lacks the legitimacy of the 
legislature in an established democracy.
78
 As desperate times call for 
desperate measures, controversies in transitional periods often require 
speedy consideration and, compared to legislative processes, judicial 
decision-making may be relatively faster and more competent in 
generating nuanced, case-by-case resolutions. Exploration of precedent in 
such periods suggests that the understandings of the rule of law are 
constructed within this transitional context.
79
 It is thus inappropriate to 
apply theories of adjudication concerned with adherence to the rule of law 
in ordinary times to transitional periods, as the relative competence and 
capacities of judiciaries and legislatures presumed in ordinary times are 
not present in transitional periods.
80
 
Finally, with regard to constitutional courts, Teitel suggests that in 
transitional periods, where economic, political, and legal transformations 
occur simultaneously, newly established constitutional courts have borne 
the institutional burden of determining new understandings of the rule of 
 
 
 75. In Hungary, the law to lift the statute of limitations to allow the prosecution of crimes 
committed in the predecessor regime was held unconstitutional as the court considered that the 
principle of predictability encompassed in the rule of law trumped the principle of substantive justice, 
and that the value of “security” and the protection of individual rights were paramount in Hungary’s 
transition. TEITEL, supra note 2, at 16–17. Contrarily, in the “extreme cases” of the German border 
guards, in deciding whether to accept the defenses in accordance with law of the predecessor regime, 
the court considered that it ought to “value the principle of material justice more highly than the 
principle of legal certainty”, thus rejecting the predecessor law. Id. 
 76. Id. at 17. 
 77. Id. at 23. 
 78. Id. at 23–24. 
  79. Id. at 17. 
 80. Id. at 24–25. See also id. at 216 which reinforces the transitional judiciary and “entirely new 
institutions” such as newly formed constitutional courts as the institution with the legitimacy to carry 
out substantial normative transformation. 
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law and, hence, of the transformation to a rule-of-law system.
81
 In 
contemporary post-Communist transitions, Teitel observed that it was the 
judiciary that delineated state power and redefined individual rights, thus 
creating a culture valuing rights. 
82
 She also highlights the importance of 
constitutional courts as new legal forums, moving away from past systems 
of centralized state power.
83
 While access to constitutional courts through 
litigation and constitutional interpretation signifies unprecedented 
governmental openness, the courts’ engagement in judicial review allows 
for promoting and upholding the rule of law.
84
 Moreover, through 
transformative adjudication, constitutional courts deploy activist principles 
of judicial review towards normative change and a more liberal rule-of-
law system.
85
 
B. Relevance of Transitional Justice Framework to China: Similarities 
Between CEE Countries and China in Transitions 
Despite the fact that China is still a Communist country and not a 
democratic society in political flux, today’s China still expounds some of 
the same features displayed by post-Communism CEE jurisdictions, such 
as rapid economic transformation and the associated social unrest. These 
common features between the transitions of CEE jurisdictions and the 
transition of China explains why Teitel’s transitional justice theory may be 
relevant to China and its judicial development discourse. 
1. Transitional Reform in Accordance with “Policy Goals” 
Academic literature has differentiated the reforms that took place in 
Poland, Hungary, and China, describing the Polish transition as radical, 
the Hungarian as gradual, and the transitional path of China as being in 
accordance with “socialist market economy” principles. 86  The 
standardized view is that China has been attempting its transition with a 
gradual approach from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy 
despite never having displayed systemic change from a socialist system to 
 
 
 81. Id. at 22. 
  82. Id. at 23. 
 83. Id. 
  84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 137. 
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a capitalist system.
87
 In contrast, Poland underwent reform according to a 
fast strategy widely known as “shock therapy,” 88  shifting towards a 
market-oriented economic system. Additionally, Poland switched from a 
socialist to a capitalist system with its transition consisting of “a mix of 
radical financial measures with delayed procedures of structural 
reforms.”89  
Nevertheless, some scholars have warned that the differentiation 
between “radicalism” and “gradualism” functions is insufficient when 
evaluating transition.
90
 The application by economists of such patterns to 
actual transition economies is restrictive and lacks value. 
91
Instead, they 
propose scrutinizing the policy goals of a transitional economy, 
considering the benefits and the expenses of completing the policy goals, 
and evaluating the appropriateness of the policy.
92
 For instance, one of the 
goals of the Polish economic reforms, beginning in January 1990, was to 
start the processes of structural and ownership transformation.
93
  
Regarding policy goals, Pomfret points out differences between China 
and CEE countries. According to Pomfret, reform in China is “intended to 
produce economic growth, not system change,” 94 whereas reform in CEE 
countries was system change-oriented, with countries taking “serious steps 
towards becoming market economies.” 95  Acting in line with stability-
oriented reform principles, governments in CEE transition economies did 
not take steps to dissolve the centrally-planned production structure until 
the end of the 1990s.
96
 
Leszek Balcerowicz, economist and former deputy prime minister of 
Poland, made the following comparisons of reform policies between China 
and Poland when reforms first started in China in the late 1970s. At that 
 
 
 87. Id. at 135. Morita and Chen later point out that China has in fact employed more system 
change-oriented measures such as promoting labor mobility through measures such as the household 
register reform. Id. at 210. 
 88. Stephen Engelberg, 21 Months of ‘Shock Therapy’ Resuscitates Polish Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/17/world/21-months-of-shock-
therapy-resuscitates-polish-economy.html. 
 89. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 135–36. See also DABROWSKI, OLEKSANDR, & SINITSINA, 
POST ADAPTATION GROWTH RECOVERY IN POLAND AND RUSSIA—SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 4 
(2004).  
 90. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 140. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 140. 
 93. Id. at 65. 
  94. Richard Pomfret, Growth and Transition: Why has China’s Performance Been So Different?, 
25 J. COMP. ECON. 422, 437 (1997).  
 95. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 211. 
 96. Id. at 141. 
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time, China faced only a mild macroeconomic imbalance, contrary to the 
dire macroeconomic state that troubled Poland in mid-1989.
97
 Under such 
circumstances, “radical stabilization” and the application of “shock 
therapy” were necessary in Poland but not in China. 98  As a result of 
choosing their specific transitional pathways, China has suffered from 
income disparity whereas Poland has been afflicted by huge 
unemployment rates.
99
 According to Morita and Chen, the prediction for 
coming years is that China will emphasize more systematic change that 
will bring about a more flexible labor movement, whereas Poland will 
emphasize enhancing economic growth as illustrated through changes to 
the highly subsidized coal industry which was large and inefficient.
100
 The 
different developmental directions of the two countries echo Morita and 
Chen’s conclusion that various ways of transition should be understood as 
evolutionary phenomena determined by and unique to the practices and 
policies of the country during transition.
101
 This, in turn, supports Teitel’s 
view that contextual differences lead to differences in the arranging of 
priorities in reconciling rule-of-law values since different countries have 
inherently different policy goals to achieve. 
2. First Line of Common Similarities: Ownership Diversification and 
State Control in Economy 
Although the initial nature of transition in CEE countries and China 
may differ as illustrated by their differing policy goals, there are common 
features in their economic transitions and the similar societal problems 
they have encountered. The first line of similarities concerns the economy. 
While there are differences in initial economic structures and policy goals, 
CEE countries and China are inherently similar in that both display shared 
heightened concerns regarding diversification of ownership and state 
control.  
Even before transitioning, the economic structures of the CEE 
countries and China were different, requiring distinct strategies and policy 
decisions unique to the different economies. Previously, the CEE economy 
 
 
  97.  In 1989, Poland experienced hyperinflation with the annual inflation rate at approximately 
3000%. See Hartmut Lehmann, The Polish Growth Miracle: Outcome of Persistent Reform Efforts 9 
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, IZA Policy Paper No. 40, 2012), available at http://ftp.iza.org/pp40.pdf.  
 98. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 142 (citing LESZEK BALCEROWICZ, POST-COMMUNIST 
TRANSITION: SOME LESSONS 30–31 (2001)). 
 99. Id. at 211. 
 100. Id. at 210–12. 
 101. Id. at 212. 
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was “overbuilt”102 with a heavy industry focus, but weak light industry and 
consumer goods and services sectors. In contrast, the abundant supply of 
Chinese peasants who were relinquished by the dismantled agricultural 
commune system turned to new labor-intensive economic sectors in the 
city.
103
 Owing to different economic structures, 80% of the Chinese 
population was not engaged in state sector work prior to the economic 
reforms but most of the CEE population worked for the heavily-subsidized 
state sector.
104
 Additionally, while the CEE population was subject to 
extensive social benefits, the rural Chinese workers received little social 
protection before 1978.
105
 The lack of security also incentivized the 
Chinese peasants to scramble for the new job opportunities available in the 
cities.
106
 Because of its labor history, China has successfully promoted a 
two-track approach of having state enterprises alongside non-state 
enterprises since the late 1970s.
107
 In contrast to Eastern Europe, China did 
not have to bear the same burden of restructuring state enterprises to 
support the economy. As a result of its reforms relating to ownership 
diversification, China experienced rapid growth in its rural regions and 
coastal areas filled with non-state enterprises and foreign direct 
investment; whereas the performance of areas with state-owned industries 
continued to be weak.
108
 
In the CEE countries, property restitution did not have an exclusively 
reparative nature;
109
 rather, restitution was deliberately linked with 
structural reform, thus taking on a mixed distributive-reparative 
character.
110
 Kuti suggests that most property restitution schemes aim to 
achieve two goals: compensating individuals for their loss of property due 
to unjust governmental actions and redefining property relationships in 
order to achieve certainty in ownership and possession, which is 
considered a prerequisite for the creation of an efficient market 
economy.
111
 Clearly, the latter social goal of restitution corresponds with 
policy concerns, but is not in line with reparative justice, which focuses 
 
 
 102. Jeffery Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms, ECON. 
POL’Y, Apr. 1992, at 104. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 112. 
 105. Id. at 104, 108. 
 106. Id. at 104. 
 107. Id. at 105. 
 108. Id. at 115. 
  109. CSONGOR KUTI, POST-COMMUNIST RESTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (Central European 
University Press, 2009), at 70.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 77. 
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solely on the rectification of past wrongs through compensation. For 
instance, in the case of Poland, restitution schemes posited in the 1990s 
were supported by pragmatic rationales to increase business efficacy, to 
encourage private entrepreneurship, and to create a new middle class;
112
 
whereas in the Hungarian reform proposals lodged in 1987 aimed at 
developing a “socialist mixed economy” and to radicalize past market 
reforms, the diversification of ownership was highlighted as a key issue to 
tackle.
113
 
Ultimately, despite the fact that Poland employed speedy privatization 
strategies and also displayed high domination of foreign ownership, its 
case bears more resemblance to the case of China than that of Russia in 
terms of state control.
114
 According to Poznanski, state control continues 
to have a role to play in post-communist transitions. 
115
 Although the 
ultimate aim of the transition might be to create a market economy, the 
process of achieving this goal depends on the state and its involvement in 
making decisions, for example, the steps the state would choose in 
withdrawing from the state-owned sector.
116
 While Russia suffered 
recession due to the weakening of state control over its economy, Poland 
exhibited more cohesive changes as the state retained control.
117
 Similarly, 
Poznanski suggests that China has retained sufficient state control of 
production to ensure continuous growth.
118
 
3. Second Line of Similarities: Social Instability 
Furthermore, there are common similarities between China and CEE 
countries with respect to social instability. With the region-wide economic 
recession taking place in CEE countries from 1989 onwards, social 
problems such as declines in productivity, soaring unemployment, and 
escalating poverty emerged.
119
 In China, dissent and discontent today go 
 
 
 112. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE VOL.2 386 (Lavinia Stan & Nadya Nedelsky eds. 
2012). 
 113. KUTI, supra note 109, at 86. It should be noted that due to financial difficulties, these 
schemes were ultimately rejected by the legislature. William R. Youngblood, Poland’s Struggle for a 
Restitution Policy in the 1990s, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 645, 668–69 (1995). 
 114. Kazimierz Poznanski, The Crisis of Transition as a State Crisis, POST-COMMUNIST 
TRANSFORMATION AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 67, 72 (Frank 
Bönker et al. eds., 2002). 
  115. Id. at 59. 
 116. Id. at 56, 59. 
 117. Id. at 65. 
 118. Id. at 76. 
  119. Tamás Réti, East Central European and Economic Transition and the West, 2 MACALESTER 
INT’L 53, 54–55 (1995). 
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beyond the establishment of opposition parties, taking the form of a larger-
scale rights movement, where dissidents seek to change the system 
through the identification of legal rights and subsequent legal and 
constitutional reform.
120
 These social issues have given rise to the 
propagation of contradicting policy goals of authorities. On the one hand, 
reforms aim at opening up and improving mobility. At the same time, the 
authorities find it paramount to retain stability and control, which makes 
them reluctant to reduce their insecurities. Compared to a democratic 
political system with separation of the three branches of state power, the 
authoritarian development system has a “relatively unstable structure”.121 
In China’s case, the one-Party rule of the CCP faces a legitimacy crisis 
and, moreover, regime change is often considered a necessary step to take 
in order for reforms to bear genuine significance.
122
 This context rightfully 
gives rise to the single Party regime’s insecurity concerning political 
stability and thus the Party-State continues to exert control albeit in a 
different form. This explains the Chinese authorities’ high sensitivity and 
vigilance regarding the political transition that is incidental to the 
economic reforms. 
This change in the form of control can be clarified by Morita and 
Chen’s distinction of wide sense and narrow sense authoritarianism. The 
former is considered derogatory as a system that fully controls both social 
economy and political life by employing violence and ideology and is 
characterized by an excessive concentration of power and a lack of 
constitutional restrictions.
123
 In the latter case there continues to be 
monopolistic political power (policies of which include disallowing party 
politics) alongside a well-developed and independent market-oriented 
system.
124
 In other words, the narrow sense authoritarian development 
model involves “low political participation” and “high economic 
growth.” 125  As China has now progressed to follow the narrow sense 
model, the form of control now deployed by the authorities has also 
become more covert. Given the sheer size of China, it has been crucial to 
maintain social stability as the transformation of the economic system 
 
 
 120. Fu Hualing, Politicized Challenges, Depoliticized Responses: Political Monitoring in 
China’s Transitions 3 (Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250073. 
 121. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 24. 
 122. Fu, supra note 120, at 28. 
 123. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 305–06. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 306. 
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takes place.
126
 Indeed, Morita and Chen remark upon the social 
instabilities that have emerged in China since the open-door and reform-up 
policy according to Deng Xiaoping’s development model. These social 
instabilities have developed as a result of the increase in social mobility 
and the proliferation of information.
127
 In the face of politicized 
challenges, there is a change in the form of control exerted by the 
authorities—the CCP’s control strategy changed from “open political 
repression”128 to an apolitical social management that no longer focuses on 
promoting ideological values.
129
 For instance, Fu notes that while the Party 
has depoliticized criminal law and refrained from using political trials on 
the one hand, it has stepped up in surveillance efforts and social 
management to prevent the social and political tension from further 
escalating.
130
 
This “control” mechanism is further exemplified by the authorities’ 
constant resort to recentralization during the economic transitional 
process. In China, the authorities have been hesitant to expand reforms 
when confronted by problems arising from industrial reforms and 
subsequently have displayed a tendency to recentralize and to limit 
enterprise autonomy during ownership diversification.
131
 Similarly, in all 
the CEE countries apart from Yugoslavia, after reform measures—such as 
the increase in enterprise autonomy and the decrease in central planning—
had been put in place, authorities constantly reverted back to 
recentralization.
132
 When problems such as increased indebtedness, 
shortages, and deficits that bring about disequilibrium flare up, they form 
excuses for authorities to shift away from decentralization and help 
legitimize governmental interventions instead.
133
 In spite of the differences 
in the historical and transitional milieu, what the countries have in 
common are the authorities’ insistence on monitoring societal, economic, 
and political changes and steering transition in the hope of preventing 
chaos. 
 
 
 126. The policy goal of maintaining social stability is a fundamental reason for why China 
employed the gradual way of transition. Id. at 342. 
 127. MORITA & CHEN, supra note 1, at 342. 
 128. Fu, supra note 120, at 1. 
 129. Id. at 1. 
 130. Id. at 17. 
 131. Susan Shirk, The Political Economy of Chinese Industrial Reform, REMARKING THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIALISM: CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE 328–29 (Victor Nee, David 
Stark & Mark Selden eds., 1989). 
 132. Id. at 330. 
 133. Janos Kornai, The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality, 24(4) J. OF 
ECON. LITERATURE 1687, 1721 (1986). 
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C. Conceptualizing “Responsive Justice” in China 
Given the similarities between China and CEE countries on economic 
restructuring and social instability during transitions, this Article is of the 
view that Teitel’s studies on transitional justice featuring CEE transitions 
is relevant to China’s justice discourse and development. As previously 
outlined, according to Teitel, three common problems arise in transitional 
justice jurisdictions. First, it is difficult to reconcile rule-of-law values in 
times of transition.
134
 Second, legislatures in transitional times often lack 
the competence required in comparison with ordinary times, thus 
prompting judicial decision making to take place.
135
 Third, constitutional 
courts usually assume a significant role in the transitional period.
136
 On the 
basis of the previous discussion of China’s recent judicial reforms from 
1999 to 2013, this Part compares the judicial context of China with those 
countries that have been analyzed under Teitel’s framework to 
contextualize the distinctive features of China’s justice system in reacting 
and responding to a rapidly transforming economy and society. Thus, this 
Part attempts to conceptualize “responsive justice” in China during 
transitional times. It also attempts to answer whether mediation should be 
abandoned or if it still has a role to play in China’s justice system and 
prospective judicial reform, given the country’s deepening marketization 
and intensifying social movements. 
1. Emphasis on the Value of Stability over the Value of Rule-of-Law: 
The Rise and Prioritization of Mediation and the Judiciary’s 
Institutional Alienation 
In academic literature, the objectives of thin theories of rule of law are 
to “ensure stability,” to “secure the government in accordance with law by 
limiting its arbitrariness,” to “enhance predictability,” to “provide fair 
dispute resolution mechanisms,” and “to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
government.”137  Despite their shared acceptance of the aforementioned 
broad goals, states may apportion different weight to these objectives, 
which in turn results in remarkable variations in legal discourses.
138
 In 
 
 
 134. TEITEL, supra note 2, at 16–17 
 135. Id. at 24. 
  136. See supra note 81.  
 137. Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion, 
ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE 
ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 1, 3 (2004). 
 138. TEITEL, supra note 2, at 17. 
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periods of rapid economic or social transformation, as are occurring in 
China, the modernization project is soon challenged by the escalation of 
social conflicts in the transitional period.  
It was reported that “public order disturbances” grew significantly in 
recent years from 8,700 incidents in 1993 to nearly 60,000 in 2003 and 
further to the range between 180,000 to 230,000 in 2010.
139
 Incidents in 
recent years have not only demonstrated a rapid increase in occurrences, 
but also have increasingly intensified and turned violent.
140
 The Rule of 
Law Development Report published by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science in 2010 revealed that the financial crisis, high unemployment, and 
a polarized society have led to a grave situation of political instability with 
an increasing number of social unrest cases.
141
 There has also been an 
outpouring of group petitioning, mass demonstrations, riots and even inter-
ethnic violence, with letters, visits (xinfang), and complaints engulfing 
governmental offices at all levels.
142
  
This influx of cases and disputes poses a serious challenge to courts’ 
efficiency in judging, adversely impacting access to justice. Combined 
with costs associated with dispute resolution and inadequate numbers of 
qualified judges and lawyers, the inadequacies of court proceedings has 
impeded China’s economic and social development. Moreover, the failure 
to address these disputes has pushed the excluded or dissatisfied to seek 
redress through other channels, such as the letters and visits system.
143
 All 
of these have endangered political and social stability, which has been the 
 
 
 139. Christian Göbel and Lynette H. Ong, Social Unrest in China (Europe China Research and 
Advice Network (ECRAN) Paper, 2012), at 8, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ 
chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/1012ecran_gobelong.pdf (last accessed June 1, 2015). 
 140. Fu, supra note 120, at 7–8. 
 141. See Lin Li, Zhongguo Fazhi Fazhan Baogao (中国法治发展报告) [China (aogaaBaogaaan 
Baogais proposit)] (2010). 
 142. Waye & Xiong, supra note 25, at 11. See also Fan Yu, Perfecting and Developing Modern 
China’s ADR Mechanism, XUEHAI J., Jan. 2003, at 81. From the perspective of Chinese scholar Fan, 
even in situations when village cases can be accepted by the courts, parties are unable to present 
legally meaningful and relevant evidence and basis for argument. Id. Consequently, courts are forced 
to reject huge amount of disputes, resulting in the strong dissatisfaction of grass roots citizens who 
cannot file their cases with the courts. Id. In cases that are managed to be tried by courts, the 
judgments made often fail to conform with local customs and reasoning, there was a significant 
increase in the disgruntled parties petitioning to state organs. Id. 
 143. Article 41 of the Constitution states that Chinese citizens have the right to make complaints 
and to petition to state organs, and the relevant state organs must deal with such complaints. XIANFA 
art. 41 (1982) (China). By 2011, many Chinese courts set up a department to take in complaint letters, 
petitions, or visits concerning judicial greivances. See Gu, supra note 52, at 328. See China, Part 4, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/jdgz/bgjy/2013-03/22/content_1789827.htm. See also Convicts 5 
Million Criminals in Five Years, XINHUA (Mar. 10, 2013), http://english.cntv.cn/20130310/102142. 
shtml.  
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top priority of the Chinese Party-State.
144
 On the other hand, despite the 
bold advocacy and impressive progress made in the past thirty years, the 
judicial system is still more a political regime than a separate professional 
institution.
145
 As the judiciary has been increasingly subject to political 
control, the challenges facing the judiciary and judicial reform in China 
include not only the intense conflicts associated with full-scale social and 
economic transitions, but also the unpredictable struggle of political 
ideology to deal with pressing reality.
146
 
In this context, according to Zhang’s observation, leaving aside other 
factors such as biased ruling, judicial corruption, and unbalanced 
enforcement, the entire judicial system is institutionally inaccessible and 
ineffective, creating an “institutional alienation.”147 The judiciary has been 
caught in between judicial justice, realized through an independent 
judiciary exercising impartial adjudication of disputes, and practical 
popularity as a means to provide the political regime with much needed 
legitimate support.
148
 As a result, under the direction of political policy, 
some judicial mechanisms, or “judicial policy,” must be deployed to settle 
disputes that may not be suitable for their application in a rule-of-law 
context at all. The adoption of mediation, apart from drawing on Chinese 
historical and cultural roots of harmony, is perceived more as a means to 
divert disputes from the overtaxed judiciary, to massage social conflicts, 
and to ensure that the judicial system operates in accordance with political 
policy.
149
 The rise of, and even priority of, mediation in judicial 
proceedings is one such judicial policy and exemplifies the “institutional 
alienation” of the Chinese judiciary in transitional times. 
Mediation has been widely used in all kinds of civil proceedings under 
the political policy to maintain social stability.
150
 It has thus been 
concluded that after the transition from a planned economy to market 
economy that took over thirty years, the judicial reform on mediation has 
taken a full cycle—from mediation first in the 1980s, to mediation on the 
 
 
  144. Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 51. 
 145. Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 533, 538–41 
(2007). 
 146. Id. at 547–48. 
 147. Xianchu Zhang, Civil Justice Reform with Political Agendas, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 253, 259 (2011). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Waye & Xiong, supra note 25, at 33. 
 150. The application of judicial mediation before the social transition towards a market economy 
was primarily limited to small-scale cases, such as family, neighborhood, and labor disputes. See 
Xianchu Zhang, Civil Justice Reform with Political Agendas, in Guanghua Yu (ed), The Development 
of the Chinese Legal System: Change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2011), at 259.  
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basis of law and parties’ consent in the 1990s, to deployment of mediation 
and judgment in accordance with the nature of disputes in the early 2000s, 
and finally, returning back to priority of mediation since 2009, however.
151
 
Compared with the prevalence of mediation in the 1980s, the current 
judicial policy on mediation, as a distinctive Chinese response by the 
justice system to economic and societal transition, is largely a political 
arrangement to achieve stability.  
2. Inadequate Competence and Capacities of the Judiciary and 
Legislature: From Passive Acceptance to Active Appraisal of 
Mediation by Chinese Judges 
Scholars have argued that effective access to justice is fundamental to 
the promotion of the rule of law and that this can be accomplished by 
formal and informal measures.
152
 A combination of formal and informal 
access to justice can be found in most societies, as the high costs of 
litigation imply that there are insufficient judicial resources to deal with 
the community’s demand for redress.153 Such societal problems have been 
particularly severe during China’s rapid urbanization, which is not 
comparable to an established economy in ordinary times.
154
 Scarce 
resources aside, tough socioeconomic cases tend to raise novel issues for 
which courts often lack clear legislative or judicial guidance. 
Benchmarked against developed countries’ standards, with regard to the 
general correlation between wealth and institutional development, 
governance institutions in China nonetheless remain relatively weak.
155
  
Fu and Peerenboom argued that in the case of China, given the courts’ 
inability to provide an effective remedy in the socioeconomic cases, access 
to the courts should be limited.
156
 Moreover, the dejudicialization of 
socioeconomic cases has become evident as the government has directed 
 
 
 151. Zhang, supra note 147, at 260.  
 152. Edgardo Buscaglia & Paul B. Stephen, An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of Formal 
Versus Informal Dispute Resolution on Poverty: A Governance-Based Approach, 25 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 89 (2005).  
 153. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, PROGRAMMING FOR JUSTICE: ACCESS FOR 
ALL” ASIA-PACIFIC RIGHTS AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE 5–6, 72–74 (2005), available at http://www. 
unicef.org/ceecis/Programming_for_Justice.pdf; See also Christopher Hodges et al., Costs and 
Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, ¶ 70 (U. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 55/2009, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1511714. 
 154. Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded 
Assumptions 10 (La Trobe L. School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008/11, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1283179. 
 155. Id. at 22. 
 156. Fu & Peerenboom, supra note 24, at 115. 
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such disputes away from court adjudication towards alternative 
mechanisms such as mediation in view of the courts’ lack of resources and 
competence to provide effective relief in such cases.
157
 Subsequently, with 
the restrictions imposed on both access to the courts and the courts’ role, 
non-judicial mechanisms such as mediation are strengthened to address 
citizens’ concerns in such cases. Correspondingly, there has been a re-
emergence and revitalization of judicial mediation among Chinese courts 
and the gradual acceptance of judicial mediation by Chinese judges 
themselves in response to the sharp increase in socially-oriented cases 
since 2006.
158
 Overall, there has been a gradual transformation in the 
perspective of Chinese judges and a remodeling of their role from mere 
passive involvement to an active appraisal of mediation with flexible 
implementation.
159
  
The judges’ initial passivity was prompted by their pursuit of 
professionalism. As in the first two rounds of judicial reform (1998-2008), 
the law proliferated and the professionalization of judges and efficacy of 
litigation improved.
160
 Mediation, which was previously associated with 
Confucian cultural influence and Maoist attempts to impose socialist 
ideology,
161
 came to be viewed as inconsistent with China’s aspirations for 
the development of the rule of law.
162
 Moreover, given the pressures for 
efficiency, mediation was further challenged by Chinese judges as being 
time-consuming.
163
 Judicial mediation in China was also challenged by 
scholars in the West who viewed adjudication and mediation as two 
entirely separate dispute resolution processes, the blending of which 
without proper safeguards was deemed to destroy the sanctity of justice 
and impartiality.
164
 While Western-style court-annexed mediation 
promotes mediation as a problem-solving process supportive of the 
parties’ self-determination, judicial mediation in China takes a more 
evaluative role that is likely to involve the directing of parties.
165
 There are 
also concerns about the conflicting role of mediators and judges and 
 
 
 157. Id. at 112. 
 158. Waye & Xiong, supra note 25, at 24. 
 159. Interview with Xian Yifan, Former Judge at the Guangzhou District People’s Court (Jan. 25, 
2013). 
 160. Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 42. 
 161. STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO ch. 3 (2002). 
 162. Randall Peerenboom & He Xin, Dispute Resolution in China: Patterns, Causes and 
Prognosis, 1 E. ASIA L. REV. 25 (2009). 
 163. Id.  
 164. Waye & Xiong, supra note 25, at 21–22. 
 165. See generally Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, Internal Contradictions of Judicial Mediation, 39(2) 
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associated breaches of confidentiality because the mediator-judge is 
allowed to participate in private caucuses with parties and may 
inadvertently use information that he or she would not have access to in 
litigation.
166
 
Since the SPC engaged in a deliberate policy of revival of mediation, 
judges have begun to gradually accept and even actively appraise 
mediation for a variety of reasons.
167
 Insofar as difficult disputes over 
access to resources and participation in decision making about 
development resulting from China’s economic transformation are 
concerned, judicial mediation is more attractive than litigation because it 
obviates the need for articulation of a clear legal position and is more 
likely to avoid any enforcement difficulties that may follow.
168
 In 
association with the escalation of socioeconomic and sociopolitical 
conflicts, fewer adjudicatory approaches in litigation can make Chinese 
judges respond more effectively to the needs of litigants, allowing them to 
take into account political and social considerations in decision-making 
and thus contribute more successfully to social stability.
169
 To emphasize 
the importance of mediation and mediatory justice, in 2007, the SPC 
issued Opinion on Further Increasing the Positive Role of Mediation (in 
Litigation) in Constructing Socialism and a Harmonious Society.
170
 Article 
5 of this document provides a list of cases where judicial mediation should 
be pursued. These cases involve: community interests that require the 
assistance of governments; class action lawsuits; complex facts or 
emotional confrontation between the parties; insufficient evidence or 
evidence not clearly supporting the matter; sensitive socioeconomic 
issues; or requests for retrial.
171
  
The Opinion further mandates that Chinese judges should undergo 
mediation training on an annual basis and that mediation should be 
included in the judicial performance assessment.
172
 Thus, the SPC has 
given a clear message that judicial mediation has become a target and has 
 
 
 166. Wave & Xiong, supra note 25, at 22. 
 167. Minzner, supra note 9, at 936. 
 168. Wave & Xiong, supra note 25, at 24. 
 169. Huang Jialiang, How are Laws Practiced? A Sociological Analysis Based on a Judicial Case 
in China, 41 CHINESE SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 55, 55–57 (2008).  
 170. Zui gao renmin fayuan guanyu jin yi bu fahui susong tiaojie zai goujian shehui zhuyi hexie 
shehui zhong jiji zuoyong de ruogan yijian [Supreme People’s Court Opinion on Further Increasing 
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(Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.chinacourt.org/law.shtml?file_id=116688. 
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 172. Id. arts. 20, 24. 
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direct career consequences upon Chinese judges.
173
 The message is clear 
as evidenced by the fact that there are incentives for Chinese judges to 
shift their role and appraise mediation actively.  
Chinese judges’ newfound support for and quick adaptation of 
mediation can also be analyzed using Tamanaha’s theory of legal 
instrumentalism and rule of law.
174
 As the practice of law reinforces the 
approach of utilizing law instrumentally, Chinese judges inevitably are 
affected and thus view law in instrumental terms.
175
 With the rise in 
priority of mediation, Chinese judges have changed from expert 
(zhuanjiafaguan 专家法官) and elite judges (jingyingfaguan 精英法官) to 
more populist (pingminfaguan 平民法官 ) and stability-minded judges 
(weiwenfaguan 维稳法官). Moreover, the strategy of handling cases by 
involving mediation has become increasingly innovative and flexible. 
Chinese judges are altering their initial approach as neutral middlemen 
(juzhongtiaojie 居中调解) who only mediate on the basis of facts and 
evidence they are directly exposed to, to the current adoption of 
“mediation all around” (quanmiantiaojie 全面调解), wherein judges make 
use of all information they can procure from disputants.
176
 Additionally, 
the venue and scope of judicial mediation has moved from discussions in 
in-court trial rooms (zuotangwen’an 坐堂问案）to on-site investigations 
(tianjianditou 田间地头), such as organizing in-the-farm discussions in 
disputes relating to collective ownership of farm land.
177
  
3. Distinction from Teitel’s Framework: China’s “Grand Mediation” 
Model to Resolve Constitutional Disputes 
Differentiating the Chinese responsive justice model in economic and 
societal transitions from other countries involved in the transitional justice 
framework, Teitel stresses the importance of a constitutional court to take 
up the role of determining the understanding of the rule of law in a 
transitional period while China does not have such a court.
178
 Instead, 
“grand mediation” (datiaojie 大调解) has been argued as a Chinese home-
 
 
 173. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.  
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 178. Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. 
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grown alternative and a transitional constitutional dispute resolution 
mechanism.
179
  
Introduced in 2002, “grand mediation” is a comprehensive stability 
maintenance and dispute resolution mechanism that involves a top-down 
joint effort of the government, Party, and social institutions.
180
 Grand 
mediation was designed to resolve complex disputes at the basic level and 
ensure social stability by synthesizing various types of mediation
181
 and 
has been increasingly used in the past decade to handle complex disputes 
that might generate mass citizen discontent or social unrest, including land 
expropriation, corporate reorganizations of failed enterprises, and 
collective grievances against local officials.
182
 Most recently, in April 
2011, the Central Party Committee for Comprehensive Management 
composed of Public Security, the SPC, and other agencies at the central 
level jointly issued the Guiding Opinion on Deepening and Pushing 
Forward Grand Mediation Work for Contradictions and Disputes 
(“Guiding Opinion”). 183  An interesting feature of the grand mediation 
move under the 2011 Guiding Opinion is that different stakeholders are 
represented in the process of mediation and hear what should otherwise be 
under the auspices of the constitutional court. Mediator teams are formed 
by representatives of local Party committees, people’s congresses, 
people’s political consultative conferences, and administrative units at the 
local level.
184
 Local Party committees and government leaders thus 
provide unified leadership and guidance on grand mediation work.
185
 
Stability management offices at each level are responsible for the 
organization of grand mediation platforms and the investigation of 
disputes.
186
 Meanwhile, people’s courts are to focus on solving regular 
 
 
 179. Id. at 147. 
 180. Zhu Suli, Guanyu Nengdong Sifa yu Datiaojie (NEEDS CHARACTERs) [On Judicial 
Activism and Grand Mediation], 1 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学）[CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 5 (2010) 
(discussing the Party demands on courts to realize goals of harmonious development and the judicial 
activism necessary to address such demands). 
 181. Hand, supra note 178, at 132. 
 182. Zhu, supra note 180, at 1; See also Minzner, supra note 9, at 945. 
 183. Guanyu shenru tuijin maodun jiufen da tiaojie gongozuo de zhidao yijian (关于深入推进矛
盾纠纷大调解工作的指导意见) [Guiding Opinion on Grand Mediation Work], (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.tpan.cn/html/7938.htm [hereinafter Guiding Opinion on Grand Mediation Work]. As listed 
at the top of the Guiding Opinion, other agencies at the central level involved in issuing the document 
include the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, the 
Ministry of Justice and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. See Article 1 of the Guiding 
Opinion.  
 184. Id. ¶ 6. 
 185. Id. ¶ 19. 
 186. Id. ¶ 20. 
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civil cases as well as minor criminal cases and they can provide legal 
opinions in the dispute resolution.
187
 
Although grand mediation is designed to contain disputes at the local 
level, Hand suggests that the tensions and dynamics that the mechanism is 
designed to address are present in the context of constitutional disputes, 
thus making grand mediation a suitable transitional constitutional dispute 
resolution mechanism.
188
 Grand mediation involves consultation among 
multiple stakeholders such as the Party, state, and social institutions with 
intersecting interests.
189
 It also gives judges roles as legal advisors, creates 
limited space for citizen bargaining, and facilitates the integrated 
consideration of legal, political, and social interests in settlement 
outcomes.
190
 Because of the abstract nature of China’s constitutional 
context, tensions between provisions about rights and duties, tension 
between citizens’ rights and Party leadership, and the weakness of judicial 
institutions are all difficult to translate into principled “black and white” 
constitutional interpretations. To replicate the grand mediation framework 
to deal with constitutional disputes, Hand further suggests that there could 
be a faction composed of Party, administrative, legislative, and judicial 
figures at the leadership level which would decide whether to take up 
constitutional disputes originating from the lower levels and to proceed 
with consultations with Party-State institutions equipped with the expertise 
in the dispute resolution area.
191
 The central Political-Legal Committee is 
in charge of coordinating matters with the aid of National People’s 
Congress leaders who are formally responsible for constitutional 
supervision; whereas the SPC acts as a legal advisor and offers 
interpretations of the constitutional provisions for Party-State leaders to 
deliberate. 
While Hand retains an optimistic view of grand mediation as a 
transitional model of constitutional dispute resolution, grand mediation 
practices have been criticized by other commentators as mere political 
conferences, which attempt to curb protests.
192
 The model has been 
criticized since discussions can be conducted with limited reference to 
legal norms, outside of legal channels at any stage before or after the 
litigation process, and without the actual participation of the nominal 
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parties.
193
 During the bargaining process amongst officials, political 
pressure is asserted on uncooperative bureaus, forcing them to 
compromise.
194
 Ultimately, judges are only one of the many parties at the 
political bargaining table and since their career evaluations are at stake, 
they have pressure not to act in a neutral fashion.
195
 Furthermore, 
commentators find the government bureaus’ participation at the leadership 
level problematic, remarking that these agencies may be inclined to satisfy 
governmental policy interests instead of citizens’ needs.196  
Nevertheless, China’s current political context does not allow for the 
establishment of a constitutional court, and vesting the power of judicial 
review with the SPC is not a viable option given parliamentary supremacy 
in China.
197
 Under the grand mediation framework, since legal opinions 
presented by judges are not formal rulings, they do not constitute formal 
challenges to the constitutional authority of the National People’s 
Congress or lead to tensions between Party-State institutions.
198
 As 
judicial institutions do not currently play a formal role in constitutional 
interpretation, there would be an elevation in judicial participation under 
the new proposed framework as judicial officials serve as legal advisors in 
the multiparty political negotiations. Courts are given an unprecedented 
and meaningful (albeit limited) role in molding official understandings of 
the Constitution.
199
 Moreover, the grand mediation model helps increase 
government legitimacy. Despite providing only limited space for citizen 
bargaining, it facilitates the integrated analysis of legal, political, and 
social interests in settlement outcomes, blending interests of the Party, 
state institutions, and society and thus providing a more sustainable 
dispute resolution mechanism as opposed to short-term solutions of 
repression and concessions.
200
 Hence, grand mediation may arguably be 
identified as a Chinese home-grown alternative to respond to 
constitutional justice in transition. 
To serve China’s economic and political transitions when “supremacy 
of law” in social management is still constrained, grand mediation might 
serve the transitional rule-of-law purpose by introducing a flexible method 
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for parties which lessens the rigidity of the law. As elaborated above, the 
proposed bargaining process is influenced by both law and political-legal 
personnel, who are responsible for ensuring that mediation outcomes are 
consistent with the Party’s political interests and the objective of 
maintaining stability through the persuasion or even the pressuring of 
parties.
201
 Accordingly, the functioning of the grand mediation model 
could be seen in a different light than Teitel’s theory of requisite 
constitutional courts in justice system in periods of transitional times. As 
the latter focuses on the importance of constitutional courts to break free 
from the past system, the Chinese transitional grand mediation model 
seems to bring the centralized state power closer by allowing, if not 
magnifying, its continuing influence in the application of law. 
Nonetheless, this is arguably in line with the Party-State’s emphasis on 
social stability (which incorporates the emphasis on all rounds of 
mediatory justice), the importance of which trumps various rule of law 
values in times of flux. 
D. Conclusion on China’s “Responsive Justice” During Transitional 
Times: Mediatory Justice, What Road Ahead?  
China’s justice during transitional times places the task of maintaining 
social stability in the hands of the judiciary, which deploys various layers 
of mediation so that decisions are made to balance political and social 
consequences.
202
 Comparing and contrasting the countries under Teitel’s 
framework with China, the unique features of China’s justice in 
transitional periods are identified as justice responding to economic and 
social stability, or the “stability-driven responsive justice,” where 
mediation is prioritized. The mediatory justice can be seen as a 
dejudicialization of the courts at all levels and in all types of disputes. 
However, the increasing emphasis upon mediation has been challenged as 
a government attempt to undermine the rule of law and prevent the 
development of a strong independent judiciary.
203
 Among these views is 
Minzner’s critique, which argues that China is making a “turn against 
law.”204  
Is China’s surge in mediation a turn against law? What will the road 
ahead be for China’s mediatory justice, the revitalization of which is 
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thought to blend China’s own traditions and historical legacy? Should 
mediation be completely abandoned? Scholars have argued that mediation 
in itself is not an evil.
205
 China’s shift away from trials and towards 
mediation is not entirely unique. Beginning in the West, and now spread to 
the developing world, parties in many countries face prohibitive litigation 
costs.
206
 National judiciaries are overloaded and are increasingly 
challenged by insufficient access to justice or lengthy trial delays.
207
 Many 
jurisdictions in the world are actively incorporating mediation into court 
adjudication for achieving justice.
208
  
Does mediation have a proper role to play in the justice system during 
China’s transitional times? As the prevailing economic, historical, and 
sociological contexts determine a country’s legal framework, the structure 
of its legal institutions, and its society’s pathways to justice, the balance 
between formal and informal dispute resolution will inevitably be path 
dependent.
209
 Scholars have argued that the architecture of one justice 
system should not be transposed to another since, in practice, the outcome 
of such transplantation is that the imported Western rule-of-law reforms 
mesh poorly with local realities.
210
 Such failure results in “backlash” 
consisting of experiments with traditional or community mediation 
institutions that respond better to local conditions.
211
 It is acknowledged 
that China’s own traditions and historical legacy will continue to play a 
significant role in determining the future course of its judicial reform. 
Nevertheless, shift of dispute resolution patterns such as advocacy of 
mediatory justice, and the pressurizing target responsibility system to 
achieve political objectives should not be applied by Chinese authorities to 
curb rule of law and judiciary autonomy.
212
 In short, mediation and its 
associated mediatory justice should not be abused or over-used as a means 
for exercising political will. On the contrary, mediation should be treated 
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as a dispute resolution method for channeling judicial caseload and 
achieving a societally better outcome.  
Carefully drafted mediation policies would help solve imminent 
problems in China. In light of China’s social situation and its prevalent 
economic and social conflicts, mediation can produce a socially acceptable 
result, reducing protests and letters and visits. This is evident in judges’ 
growing acceptance of employing judicial mediation in resolving 
disputes.
213
 The grand mediation model that has developed in the past 
decade as a transitional constitutional dispute resolution mechanism is 
another example of an attempt to achieve both justice and societal 
expectations. In a huge developing country like China, insufficient 
resources, developing legal institutions, and an enduring legal culture will 
all impact the manner of performance of Chinese justice and the pace and 
means of its future reform. During this process, the Chinese Party-State 
faces the pressure of maintaining both social order and regime legitimacy. 
The Chinese government needs to re-consider the relevance of its home-
grown alternatives of justice during transitional times, i.e. mediatory 
justice; most importantly, how mediatory justice should be properly 
adopted under the rule-of-law. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND EVALUATIONS 
This Article has discussed many facets of the justice system in China. 
The encumbered Chinese court system has been seriously addressed for 
over more than a decade, especially in the two rounds of SPC reforms of 
the people’s courts, in response to rising international pressures to 
establish an independent judiciary in China. Local protectionism and 
corruption may be mitigated by SPC directives. The Second-Five-Year-
Reform-Outline (2004–2008) appears to be particularly bold in exploring a 
number of goals for upgrading the Chinese judicial system. The 
professionalism-building reform of the Chinese courts and judges has been 
hampered recently, and the publication of the Third-Five-Year-Reform-
Plan (2009–2013) has disappointed many legal scholars and judicial 
practitioners. 
To assess the development of the Chinese justice system during the 
country’s economic and societal transitions, particularly its discourse over 
the past fifteen years, the international literature on transitional justice 
coined by Teitel featuring CEE countries is relevant. The CEE countries 
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have a lot in common with China in terms of economic restructuring, such 
as the dilemma between ownership diversification and state control, and 
societal transformation, such as the problems of social instability. As 
Teitel observed, in such transitional periods, the law is caught between the 
past and future, retrospective and prospective, the individual and the 
collective. Accordingly, transitional justice is justice associated with this 
context;
214
 however, after examination of China’s judicial context, it seems 
Teitel’s framework cannot apply squarely to the case of China. It is not 
completely suitable to China as the Party continues to be unwilling to give 
up socialism and totalitarianism in its governance. This echoes with the 
fact that China is not a transitional state in the political sense. The purpose 
of China’s justice reform during economic and societal transitions is 
neither to affect the political discourse nor to advance democratization.
215
 
By revitalization of mediatory justice, the justice reform in China is more 
of a “responsive justice” to achieve “social stability” objectives. 
Instead of allowing the gradual emergence of independent legal 
institutions to handle disputes, the Party authorities impose controls on the 
court system in the name of social stability. Hence, shifts in dispute 
resolution patterns in China, juggling the path of judicial reform during the 
transitional period, as it now demonstrates (emphasis and priority of 
mediation) differ from justice reform developments elsewhere. While 
officials and scholars in other countries search for effective alternatives to 
litigation to respond to challenges of high costs of access to justice and 
adjudicative efficiency, justice patterns in China in transitional times 
(particularly its recent reforms), have featured an authoritarian political 
reaction to the growing levels of social protest and conflict in the Chinese 
society.
216
 In other words, reforms are not made for the benefit of citizens, 
but rather as a mechanism to contain conflicts and curb complaints to 
higher authorities. The Chinese government should re-evaluate the 
relevance of its home-grown alternatives, particularly mediatory justice, 
but should think wisely about their proper forms from a legal mindset. 
Mediation policies should be carefully drafted to help relieve judicial 
caseload, enhance access to justice, and achieve a societally better 
outcome, all of which are imminent problems in China’s deepening 
marketization and intensifying social movements. 
Unlike other transitional economies and societies where the judicial 
justice has developed to facilitate economic development and political 
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reorientation, in China, the task of maintaining social stability has been 
assigned to the judiciary. With the rule of law as a developing concept, the 
judiciary in China as part of the authoritarian regime cannot make their 
decisions without first considering political and social consequences. In 
this context, any future judicial reform needs to take into account social 
reality. Pragmatic compromise may have to be required to skillfully handle 
the complexity of economic, societal, and prospective political transitions 
in China.  
It is fair to say that China is still struggling for its optimal justice 
framework as the Party leadership is in a dilemma with respect to the role 
of the judiciary in Chinese society and governance during transitions. 
Although it has been strenuously argued that people’s courts and 
individual judges should be significantly empowered to play a more active 
role in adjudication of cases, fundamentally reforming Chinese courts will 
be a very difficult and complex task which requires that an entire rule-of-
law system be put into practice. The rule-of-law process, including the 
future reform of the Chinese judiciary, is increasingly pushed forward by 
more civilized Chinese society to orient the judicial system towards the 
real safeguarding of justice. In the long run, the trend of judicial reform to 
support judicial professionalism, independence, and efficiency is 
irreversible. During this process, the Chinese government should 
reconsider the path of China’s judicial reform and the importance and 
relevance of both Western experience (universal-value-based rule-of-law, 
judicial independence) and home-grown alternatives (mediatory justice, 
but in legal forms) so as to render “responsive justice” into serious judicial 
justice. 
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